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Taking Up The
Challenge Of Space:
New
Conceptualisations
Of Space In The
Work Of Peter
Sloterdijk And
Graham Harman
Marijn Nieuwenhuis
ABSTRACT: The arguably two most creative
theoretical contributions on established
understandings of space have recently been
provided in Peter Sloterdijk’s “Spheres” [Sphären]
trilogy and in the works of Graham Harman. Their
work reveals a strong Heideggerian presence
which can be traced back to the importance
granted to concepts such as Dasein (in the case of
Sloterdijk) and “tool-analysis” (for Harman). Both
authors employ the concept of space to challenge
the authority of traditional understandings of
metaphysics and subject-oriented ontology.
This paper will analyse the role of space in their
work and search for possibilities that could enable
a conceptual synthesis. Such a preliminary
investigation into the conceptual foundations of
space should allow for a speculative
reengagement with the long abandoned question
of how space ontologically relates to being. The
objective of this exercise, therefore, is to resume
speculation about key concepts and ideas that
have long been abandoned by the social sciences.
INTRODUCTION
This essay will argue that space is not an
autonomous container in which things merely
exist. Space is instead speculated to be an
inseparable quality of objects that relate. This
argument is therefore not the same as that
conceded earlier by Leibniz in his 1715-1716
correspondences with Clarke. Leibniz, contra the
Newtonians, argued that space was neither
absolutist nor autonomous from objects. He
famously argued instead for a relational space
that was “an order of co-existences” (Leibniz
2001: 13)[2]. This order was consequentially
characterised by distance and situations relative
to positions. Casey (1997a: 362, original
emphasis) describes Leibniz then, as the “primary
culprit” for the modern loss of the particularity of
place, the denial of infinitive space and for
developing “a new discipline of ‘site analysis’
(analysis situs, a rigorous analytic-geometric
discipline)”. The closing-off of the problem of
space led to a so-called “fallacy of the misplaced
concreteness [of space]” (Whitehead 1948). The
way we experience space is not geometric.
Neither is our knowledge of space a priori to
space itself. My small flat is for me not definable
by the geometric measurements of its interior. It is
instead my place of dwelling. It is historical, warm,
cosy, and familiar; it is home. Focusing on its
geometric measurement would deprive the room
from what it is, or what Heidegger (1996) called
continentcontinent.cc / ISSN: 21599920| This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
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its “worldhood”. Lefebvre (1991), inspired by
Heidegger, famously argues for a “true space”
rather than a constructed “truth of space”. Our
modern knowledge of space has however closed-
off speculations of what space could be. The
limiting of space, by our particular modern
knowledge of it, has led to a depoliticisation of
space. While the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994)
has received a lot of attention in the social
sciences, the “spatial trap” has remained largely
unaddressed.
Sloterdijk and Harman take on a speculative
understanding of what space is. The discussion
that follows rests on the work of these two
contemporary thinkers, who have effectively
broken free from post-Kantian philosophies of
access. Speculation is important for it allows for
disclosure and, therefore, for the repoliticisation
of space. The act of speculating playfully
challenges the concreteness of knowledge and
flirts with the possibility of contingency.
Speculations on space are of particular relevance
today, when the concreteness of space is imposed
upon us through violent acts of regional, national
and everyday bordering. Speculation about space
is therefore not merely an intellectual tool to
reintroduce its relevance in the social sciences. It
is also of concrete importance to challenge the
dominating and imposing modern knowledge of
space.
This article argues that both authors see space
instead as inherently relational and non-relational
(or anti-relational). This leads to the conclusion
that space itself is not an entity on its own. Space
lies instead at the mutual exteriority of objects
that stand in a phenomenological relation. I will
propose to analyse space from what has recently
been described as a “metaphysics of objects” (see
e.g. Harman 2002). Such a position entails a
negation of the Kantian idea that human agency
grants the only viable means for accessing reality.
I will employ the work of Sloterdijk and Harman to
allow for a discussion which returns to the
fundamental question of what space is. This point
will be elaborated on and consequentially used to
argue for a speculative return to a revised form of
realism.
The paper’s position starts from the idea that
every object exists in something
andwith something. This Heideggerian-inspired
notion is then used to challenge and replace
traditional metaphysics with a “flattened” and
“relational” ontology. Speculating about the
potentiality of different forms of Being[3], other
than human Dasein, allows us to think of other
“worlds” that are independently constructed of
human consciousness. This essay does however
not entail a return to a raw version of scientific
naturalism, for which reality is constituted by bare
physicality, but wishes to commence from a
phenomenological position that considers reality
to be always of an intentional category. This idea
of intentionality is in the work of the two authors
removed from the idealism of an earlier
phenomenology and replaced by a more object
oriented mode of access.
Contemporary discussions on space have been
shaped and taken over by abstract discussions of,
for example, the ill-defined phenomenon of
“globalisation”. The emphasis on such
abstractions symbolises a worrying trend to think
of space as detached from objects and devoid of
access. Peter Sloterdijk famously expressed the
concern that discussions about the globe make
little sense, because we never find ourselves
outside of it. It is however not only the space of
the globe which is always withdrawn from us. All
spaces are both withdrawn and simultaneously
always present in an allusive form. Space allows us
to identify, classify and differentiate objects.
Space is however also non-relational, because
space does not allow us to ever fully grasp the
objects in it. Space is in this article argued to
belong to the world of phenomenology. Space
allows for the coming into existence of worlds.
Space is worlding. The capacity of space “to
world” is not limited to human experience.
Objects similarly “world”. There is a growing need
to return to discussions that start from the small
and the tangible to shed light on the relationship
between Being and space. Speculations about the
meaning of space could additionally help
challenge historically constructed and socially
embedded understandings of space. This essay
therefore hopes to modestly contribute to a
growing body of literature which proposes to
return to the big questions or what Quentin
Meillassoux (2011) calls the “great outdoors” from
which philosophy and the social sciences
originated.
The thinkers I will be discussing in this paper both
attempt to reengage with the prehistoric essence
of Being and its relationship to space. Their work
signifies (to different extents and purposes) a
trend to move away from traditional post-Kantian
philosophies in search of an alternative and
progressive form of metaphysics. There are
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/171
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admittedly many differences between Sloterdijk
and Harman’s work which could make a
comparative assessment of their understandings
of space a challenging exercise. Their tone and
style of writing, but also their theoretical origins
and philosophical starting positions are largely
diverging. One of the things they do share in
common, besides the obvious spatial
predisposition in their writings, is the great
influence that Heidegger’s Being and Time enjoys
in their work. The shared appreciation for what
they both define as the greatest work of
20th century philosophy will therefore constitute
an important component in this article. The
mutual appreciation of both thinkers for the
relational ontology of the French philosopher and
anthropologist Bruno Latour is similarly of
noticeable influence in their work. Both Harman
and Sloterdijk not only employ Latourian terms
and concepts, but also draw inspiration from his
wish to pluralise the concept of “world” and to
repopulate it with a larger number of both
animate and inanimate actors.
Peter Sloterdijk, the thinker discussed in the first
section, has only recently been introduced to the
Anglo-Saxon academic world[4], but has for some
time already been a household name in
continental philosophy. Sloterdijk’s seminal work 
Spheres [Sphären], on which this paper mainly
draws, is characterised by its post-Heideggerian
approach in enabling a more spatial
understanding of ontology. His work is and
should, according to him, be understood as the
spatial companion to Heidegger’s Being and
Time. Graham Harman, whose “Object-Oriented
Ontology” (OOO) is discussed in section two,
comes from a very different theoretical tradition.
Harman combines the clarity of writing
characteristic of analytical philosophy with the
ontological insights of earlier phenomenologists
such as Husserl, Zubiri, Whitehead among others.
Harman gained prominence as a founding
member of the so-called “Speculative Realism”
(SR) school. Harman’s OOO rests on a revision of
Heidegger’sBeing and Time, in which he, as with
Sloterdijk, attempts to transcend Heidegger, to
arrive at a potent and fertile form of realism. The
third section of this article will attempt to pull the
two thinkers closer together to allow for a critical
engagement on the basis of their different
conceptualisations of space. Such a dialogue will
be translated into a preliminary synthesis, which
will allow us to start speculating about the
conceptual challenges that space poses to Being.
The act of translation is admittedly not an
exclusive constructive exercise. The section will
therefore be careful not to lose sight of what
might get lost in the making of such a synthesis.
The conclusion will then summarise some of the
main findings and reiterate the argument that
space is inseparable from the Being of objects.
SLOTERDIJK AND SPHEROLOGY
Taking his inspiration from oriental philosophy,
French post-structuralism and German critical
theory, Sloterdijk is as much a thinker of
everything (but never just anything) as an eclectic
“intellectual magpie, taking inspiration and ideas
from a wide-range of intellectual sources in the
German language and beyond, arranging them in
new and surprising ways” (Elden 2012: 3).
Sloterdijk, however, reserves a specific role for
phenomenologically-inclined thinkers who provide
him with the possibility to discover and elaborate
on the ontological dimensions of space or, in
Sloterdijk’s own words, on the “onto-topology of
Being”. As such, space, for Sloterdijk, is
something that is simultaneously relational and
ontological.
Sloterdijk defines and studies spheres in a manner
that is redolent of Edward Casey’s profound, but
oft neglected, Fate of Place (1997) and Getting
Back into Place (2009). Sloterdijk allows spheres,
as Casey does for places, a central role in the
definition and possibility of Being itself. To “be-
there” (Da-Sein or Dasein) means for Sloterdijk
always to “be-with-something” (Mit-Sein) and to
“be-in-something” (In-Sein). The “in” and the
“with” are for Sloterdijk therefore the essential
ontological cornerstones for any being to be at
all. This insight was also made by the young
Heidegger, though he later changed directions
and chose to ever more legitimise the specificity
of human Dasein in existential terms. Sloterdijk (as
well as Harman) consequently considers his effort
as a return to the young Heidegger for whom
space was an essential element for the ontology
of Being[5].
The spatiality of Heidegger’s Dasein is composed
of “de-distancing” (or “de-severance”
orEnt-fernung) and “orientation” (“directionality”
or Ausrichtung). Malpas (2006: 91) takes the
former “to refer to the way in which specific
things take on a certain relation to us from out of
the larger structure in which they are situated”.
Heidegger (1996: 97) writes: “De-distancing
means making distance disappear, making the
being at a distance of something disappear,
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/171
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bringing it near. Dasein is essentially de-
distancing… De-distancing discovers
remoteness.” I walk across the street towards the
confectionery which allows me to become aware
of the long, thin black liquorice on sale.
Orientation by contrast “refers to the way in
which, in being involved in a certain task, I find
myself already situated in certain ways with
respect to the things and places around me… ”
(Malpas 2006: 91). For example, while eating, I
have a fork on the left of me, a knife on the right
and a plate in the middle. Heidegger (1996: 100,
original emphasis) argues that “Da-sein is spatial
by way of circumspectly discovering space so that
it is related to beings thus spatially encountered
by constantly de-distancing. As being-in which de-
distances, Da-sein has at the same time the
character of directionality.Every bringing near has
always taken a direction in a region beforehand
from which what is de-distanced approaches so
that it can be discovered with regards to its
place”. De-distancing on the basis of orientation
allows Dasein, in other words, to make sense of a
withdrawn reality in which things exist objectively
(but not ontologically) in the world (sein in).
Objects are “ontic”, while Dasein is thought to be
ontological. The latter is through its capacity of de-
distancing and orientation, therefore, “in-the-
world” (ie. “Being-in”) and “world forming” (or 
weltbildend).
“What recent philosophers referred to as ‘being-
in-the-world’ first of all, and in most cases, means
being-in-spheres… Spheres are air conditioning
systems in whose construction and calibration, for
those living in real coexistence, it is out of the
question not to participate. The symbolic air
conditioning of the shared space is the primal
production of every society” (Sloterdijk 2011: 46).
A sphere is, in yet other words, as a “world
formatted by its inhabitants… or as the spaces
where people actually live. I [ie. Sloterdijk] would
like to show that human beings have, till today,
been misunderstood, because the space where
they exist has always been taken for granted
without ever being made conscious and
explicit” (Sloterdijk in Kristal 2012: 153, original
emphasis). Spherology offers then a “theory of
the minimal conditions for the initially impersonal
process of creative self-organization which
isolated and distanced the proto-hominids from
their environment in what he [i.e. Sloterdijk] calls
‘anthropogene islands’ or ‘anthropospheres’” (van
Tuinen 2009: 110).
Heidegger showed that humans are “thrown-into-
the-world” into its “there”, but for Sloterdijk this
does not mean that we are immediately at home
in the world. He argues that “it is exactly this
concept of being-at-home in the world that must
be questioned, as to simply accept this condition
as a fact would mean to fall back into the logic of
container-physics that needs to be overcome.”
(Sloterdijk 2012: 37). Sloterdijk shows that we are
not only able, but indeed compelled to make our
own worlds. Without spheres humans would
simply not be able to survive as a species. “Being-
in-the-world” is for Sloterdijk thus first and
foremost “Being-in-a-sphere”. Such spheres are
however not singular, but always plural. Sloterdijk
provides in his 2,500-page magnum opus (1998,
1999, 2004) a historical onto-anthropological
understanding of how humans are to be
understood topologically. Topology lies at the
heart of spherology given that for Sloterdijk it is
“the topos of man [which] is a far more
determining aspect of human existence than the 
essence of man” (ten Kate 2011: 103). The topos
is for Sloterdijk “a condition of being in which our 
Dasein - to use Heidegger’s redefinition of human
existence - is fully integrated, to the extent that
the Da of our Dasein is understood as
fundamentally topical” (ten Kate 2011: 105).
Sloterdijk therefore challenges the still dominant
philosophical tradition which started with
Descartes and continuous to be of still great
importance in discussions on the essence of
human Dasein. The premise for Sloterdijk’s
ontological anthropology is not grounded in
theexistential question what being is, but revolves
instead around a “relational ‘onto-topology’” of
the places where Being is made possible. The 
Da in Dasein forms as such the first sphere. It is
also here that Sloterdijk breaks with Heidegger’s
existentialism.
Sloterdijk’s emphasis on space leads him to
detach Heidegger’s notion of a “house of Being”
from its original context of language. Sloterdijk
proposes instead a literal reading of the house,
which starts from the necessity of Being to
interact with its surroundings. Sloterdijk agrees, in
other words, with Heidegger that Being is thrown
(Geworfenen) into the world, but only to part
again ways with Heidegger to demonstrate that
this original act is followed by the development
and employment of what Sloterdijk describes as
“anthropotechnologies”. Such technologies, of
which language is only one, help construct the
“shell”, “housing” or “sphere” (Ge-Häuse) that
translates into a Foucauldian-like biopolitics of self-
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/171
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domestication. This early sphere protects beings
from the outside world and helps to transform
mere ontic being into Being. Anthropotechnology
is therefore considered to enable the
Heideggerian “clearing” (Lichtung) from which
Being-in-the-world becomes possible.
Sloterdijk conceptualises spheres in different sizes
and forms which he defines as “thought-figures”
that possess a relational capacity to being. He
chronologically analyses and discusses them
according to their size and temporal evolution.
The first volume ofSpheres (2011 [1998]) deals
with the “microspherology” [Mikrosphärologie] of
“bubbles” [Blasen]. The second volume
(1999)[6] deals with the “macrospherology”
[Makrosphärologie] of “globes” [Globen] and the
third volume (2004) with the “plural spherology”
[plurale Sphärologie] of “foam” [Schäume]. The
volumes could be read in a linear, chronological
fashion in which humans first existed in the
bubbles of the microsphere and later came to
construct more complex macro-spheres. The last
volume is a socially critical analysis of the recent
emergence of so-called “foam”. The first volume
of Spheres is for this essay however the most
relevant among the three, since it sets out the
ontological presuppositions and foundations that
will form the building blocks for the other two
books.
Bubbles are in the first volume described to be
the micro-spherology of human beings. Human
beings are, as Sloterdijk shows, always located in
a bubble which protects them from the outside
and allows them to be and remain alive. Bubbles
are, in other words, the climatologically tuned
spaces or spheres (“greenhouses” or Treibhäuser)
which allow beings immunity from the
environment (um-welt). They are also, as briefly
noted earlier, “world-forming” (weltbildend) in
that humans adjust their spherological
environment (“Greenhouse effect” or 
Treibhauseffekt). Sloterdijk discusses and
describes bubbles and spheres in both material
and in immaterial form (e.g. the uterus, the home,
the polis, etc.). In the second volume of his trilogy
he, in fact, attaches the concept of a sphere to the
globe itself. However, he never departs from
Heidegger’s fundamental idea that Dasein is
situated in a somewhere and with others. He
rather constantly deepens the importance of
being-in. To be means for Sloterdijk and, as
discussed in the next section, also for Harman,
always to be-with something and Being-with
something always takes place in something. This
forms the conceptual springboard for his
genealogical assessment of the beginnings of
spheres.
Sloterdijk’s perhaps most widely discussed
example of such a sphere is the relationship
between the foetus and the placenta that make
up the bubble of the uterus (“the original sphere”
or die Ursphäre). The intimate relationship
between the foetus and the womb is, according
to Sloterdijk, the most intimate (and therefore
closest to perfect) example of a bubble. The
structural process which allows the two “poles” to
merge into one sphere is what Sloterdijk, in
Latourian language, defines as “coupling”[7]. “We
hold the opinion that through a theory of
couplings, of genius and of complemented
existence, we can save all there is to save from
Heidegger’s interest in rootedness.” (Sloterdijk
2012: 41).
The reasons that Sloterdijk commences his
spherology and pays special attention to the
‘perfect symbiosis’ that takes place between the
placenta (the “original companion”) and the
foetus are plural. I will present here the two that I
find most appropriate for the purpose of coming
closer to Sloterdijk’s relational understanding of
space. The first of which demonstrates and
confirms the earlier suggestion that Sloterdijk is
not so much looking for an answer to the question
of what makes us human, but is rather more
interested in the question where humans are.
“Where” comes for Sloterdijk before “what”. He
therefore does not start his analysis from a
position in which humans are a priori presented as
the subjects worthy of investigation, but rather
flattens the ground for a topological
understanding ofwhere humans can come (and
have historically come) into Being. Being is in
Sloterdijk’s “onto-anthropology” removed from
its revered position as an autonomous “subject”
and effectively replaced by bipolar and multipolar
relations that enable and constitute a sphere.
Sloterdijk empirically demonstrates that within the
womb (“The inner-sphere of the absolute Mother”
or innenraum der absoluten Mutte), it is
impossible to draw an epistemological distinction
between the object and the subject. This is
because the foetus does neither recognise the
placenta nor the “‘nobjects’ ([ie.] neither subjects
nor objects) such as placental blood, intrauterine
acoustics, and other medial givens… [The] child
develops [therefore] an identity not by
recognizing itself at a distance in the mirror but
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/171
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through presubjective resonances” (van Tuinen
2007: 281). This “negative gynaecology”
(negative Gynäkologie), Sloterdijk argues,
embodies the perfect immersion of
“Being-a-pair” [Paar-Sein] in a bubble, which
ultimately bursts when the natal process
commences.
“In terms of its dramatic content, what one
generally calls ‘cutting the [umbilical] cord’ is the
introduction of the child into the sphere of ego-
forming clarity. To cut means to state individuality
with the knife. The one who performs the cut is
the first separation-giver in the subject’s history;
through the gift of separation, he provides the
child with the stimulus for existence in the
external media.” (Sloterdijk 2011: 388).
The moment the child is “thrown-into-the-World”
and has bid farewell to the placenta (“primal
companion” or the Urbegleiter) is also the
moment in which it will have to form new
relationships and in turn create and dwell in new
bubbles. The uterus is the (primordial) sphere
responsible for creating the conditions in which
the relation between the two objects literally
comes to life before the foundation of subjectivity
and the subject itself. Sloterdijk’s introduction of a
“pre-subjectivity” therefore provocatively
challenges the idea that philosophy should start
from the premise of a subject-object dichotomy
and flattens the metaphysical ground on which, as
discussed in the next section, we also find the
object oriented ontology of Graham Harman.
Sloterdijk, in another vein, argues against the idea
of the European “metaphysical age” that object
and subject are divided. He (Sloterdijk 2004: 42)
laments that they “put the soul, the self and the
human on one side, and the thing, the mechanism
and the inhuman on the other... At the same time
it denies to things and materials an abundance of
characteristics that upon closer look they in fact
do possess. If these traditional errors are
corrected respectively, a radically new view of
cultural and natural objects comes about”.
For Sloterdijk, as with Harman, objects do not
exist anonymously from each other, but must
instead always be understood in relation to other
objects. They do not have an existence prior to, or
independent from, these relations, but are also
not reducible to a set of finite relations or
qualities. The possibilities of Being are, if we
would draw Sloterdijk’s ontology to its logical
conclusion, infinite. The number of possible
spheres is, in fact, as infinitive as the number of
objects. Co-subjectivity and co-existence
[Mit-Sein] are the norm in Sloterdijk’s post-human
philosophy. Sloterdijk ridicules Cartesian notion of
subjectivity and cogito when he writes that:
“Man is a thinking meteorite. Only in contact with
what exists does his surrounding catch fire.
Through my incandescence appears what exists
and makes sense as a surrounding. I burn, and
therefore, it can't be that there is nothing. If I
burn, it is because I am here to co-exist with the
rest of what is here” (Sloterdijk in Kristal 2012:
160).
The “tragic” and “traumatic” element in the
bursting of the “ur-bubble”[8] forms the second
component in Sloterdijk’s relational onto-
topology. Sloterdijk contextualises this primordial
separation, which forces the subject to confront
the “Big Outdoors”, in both structural and
historical terms. Sloterdijk’s structural analysis
relies on and echoes Arendt’s (1998) notion of
“human natality” in which the natal function of
action works as the foundation of constant
renewal. Sloterdijk however, blends this concept
with his own philosophical anthropology to win
our attention for the importance of the historical 
whereabouts of the human. The longing for the
perfect union in the bubble of the broken womb
will, as we are told, throughout the subject’s
lifetime compel her to travel, create and dwell in
many different spheres. Human beings are for
Sloterdijk, in a Heideggerian sense, therefore
quite literally “life-enabling” and “animating”
architects and engineers. Being means for
Sloterdijk therefore first and foremost the
engineering and designing of architectural
spheres that make possible and give meaning to
existence[9].
The interaction between objects in a place is, in
other words, structurally and continually repeated
throughout the beginning of time. It is however
equally important to remember that Sloterdijk
also here again refuses to draw a strict line
between the subject and objects or between
humans and things. Every object we “confront” or
“encounter” is for Sloterdijk a relational act of
immersion. He (Sloterdijk 2011: 92, 93) describes
the insertion of a candy into one’s mouth as the
realisation that even “[t]he most basic luxury food
is suitable to convince me that an incorporated
object, far from coming unambiguously under my
control, can take possession of me and dictate its
topic to me”. He (Sloterdijk 2011: 94) follows this
line of reasoning and consequentially poses the
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provocative question what it is that “remains of
the [enlightenment] dream of human autonomy
once the subject has experienced itself as a
penetrable hollow body?”. The answer to this
question leads back to the core of Sloterdijk’s
spherology which is grounded in the idea that to
be always means to be with-something and in-
something. The reified individual or the fetish of
individualism (latin: in-dividuus or “indivisibility”) is
for Sloterdijk (as is the indivisibility of atoms for
quantum mechanics) therefore a myth. The
individual is for Sloterdijk and less explicitly (and
politically) also for Harman relationally composed
of smaller parts (as other objects). Sloterdijk’s
discussions of spheres are, to briefly sum up, as
much about the undertaking “of the experiment
to demonstrate to what extent the “being-a-pair”
[Paar-Sein] precedes all encounters” (Funcke and
Sloterdijk 2005), as they are about exposing the
myth of an autonomous individual subject. “There
are no individuals, only dividuals [Dividuen] –
humans only exist as particles, or poles of
spheres. There exist exclusively pairs [Paare] and
their extensions [Erweiterungen]…” (Sloterdijk
2001: 144, translated, see also Sloterdijk 2011: 83
ff.). These realisations are also of importance for
Sloterdijk’s genealogical record of human
relationships in spheres to which we will now
shortly shift our attention, before moving on to
Harman’s OOO.
Sloterdijk describes how the placenta in pre-
modern times was respected across different
cultures and religiously represented as the
inseparable doppelganger of the foetus. The
arrival of modernity (which Sloterdijk mockingly
describes as the regime of “placental nihilism”)
has, however, come to alienate the foetus from
the placenta, which was consequentially
excommunicated and banished from any form of
philosophical consideration[10]. “But where, as in
the most recent part of the Modern Age, the With-
space is annulled and withdrawn from the start
through the elimination of the placenta, the
individual increasingly falls prey to the manic
collectives and total mothers - and, in their
absence, to depression.“ (Sloterdijk 2001: 285).
The loss of such “intimacy” between objects (for
Sloterdijk a defining element of modernity) was
replaced by the myth of an autonomous
individuality. The analysis of the post-natal
diversification of spheres does for Sloterdijk,
however, neither start nor finish with the sphere-
dependent and sphere-creating “di-vidual”, but is
also constitutive of the genealogical foundations
of the “macro-spheres” which he (1999) discusses
in the second volume of his trilogy. The third
volume (2004) deals with the breakup of spheres
and the emergence of so-called “co-isolated
foams”. I do not believe however, that an analysis
of the last two volumes would contribute to a
better understanding of the theoretical premise of
Sloterdijk’s spatial ontology nor does this paper
seek to undertake such an endeavour[11]. Neither
of these volumes radically departs from the
conceptual ontology presented in the first volume
which shows that Being for Sloterdijk always
means to be-with something and to be-in
 something.
The philosophical foundations of Sloterdijk’s 
Spheres are, to shortly summarise, first and
foremost grounded in a historical study of the
need of Being to create interior spaces. Humans
need to be in and with something, but human
bodies themselves are similarly thein something
for another thing. Human animals “flourish only in
the greenhouse of their autogenous sphere”
(Sloterdijk 2011: 46). The capacity and necessity
to create spheres in order to be is, of course, not
reserved to humans alone, but could equally be
applied to the realm of other animate and even
inanimate entities. Every individual as much as
every other entity is an aggregate. Space for
Sloterdijk grants, in other words, the condition
necessary for the existence of Being. “It provides
room, both literally and metaphorically, for whole
species of spaces to grow and bloom, spaces of
empire, spaces of capital, spaces of signal and
communication, spaces of eros, spaces of
dreams” (Thrift 2012: 143). Space is, as Thrift
(2012: 140) notes, thus “understood
‘gynaecologically’ as a set of envelopes or
surrounds or shelters, self-animated spaces that
give their inhabitants the resources to produce
worlds”. It is this faculty of space, to produce
intentional realities for animate and imamate
objects alike, that forms the phenomenological
bridge between Sloterdijk’s theory of spheres and
the object ontology oriented (OOO) philosophy
of Graham Harman.
OBJECT ORIENTED ONTOLOGY
Graham Harman is one of the four thinkers[12] who
helped pave the early foundations of the so-called
“Speculative Realism” (SR) school. The
interdependence between the theories and
research interest of its core members and the
influence which especially Quentin Meillassoux
has had on Harman’ OOO, compels me to shortly
introduce the main philosophical principles of SR.
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Quentin Meillassoux is a former student of Alain
Badiou whose writings inspired Meillassoux’s
(2011) now famous After Finitude. The work could
be said to have served as a general introduction
to the underlying principles of the school and will
be discussed shortly in greater detail.
Speculative Realism
The theme which unites the SR thinkers is their
common discontent over the longstanding
Kantian dominance in both the analytical and
continental philosophical tradition. The realism
that SR proposes is, however, not so much a
return to a form of pre-critical realism, but rather a
third road between realism and idealism. It openly
attempts to speculate “about the nature of reality
independently of thought and of humanity more
generally” (Bryant et al., 2011: 3).
SR attacks the foundations of what is commonly
known as the Kantian “Copernican Revolution”,
which, unlike the name suggests, is argued to
refer to the exact opposite of the decentring of
human existence. Kant is said to have been
among the first to make our access to the world
dependent upon our knowledge of it. This form of
so-called “correlationism” is, Meillassoux (2011:
118) argues, the exact opposite of the task
pursued by the empirical sciences which aim “to
actually uncover knowledge of a world that is
indifferent to any relation to the world”. The task
which SR sets upon itself is therefore nothing
short of a challenging of the Kantian dualistic
thinking.
SR is, crudely summarised, centred on a revision
of Kant’s inaccessible “thing-in-itself” (das Ding an
sich). Meillassoux shows that the thing-in-itself is
temporally outside human access. He uses the
example of a fossil (the “arche-fossil”) to show
that we cannot come to terms with things that
temporally existed prior (ancestrally) to our
knowledge of it. This supports his thesis that
things not only exist temporally autonomous from
human consciousness, but also independent from
Kantian facticity. Harman’s argument moves
beyond Meillassoux’stemporal critique. He argues
that correlationism not only fails to explain the
existence of things before and after human
temporality, but that it is also incapable of talking
about realities that are spatially outside of
facticity. “The correlationist seems no better able
to account for the falling vase than for the
ancestral formation of the earth” (Harman, 2011c:
42). Herman notes that “spatial exteriority is the
really crucial point… [and its omission inAfter
Finitude] might be a candidate for the ‘blind spot
[of Meillassoux’s work]…’” (2011a: 89). Harman
notes that things are perfectly able to exist in a
reality that is unknown to us.
Thinking about something is, according to SR,
always for me and relies thus on what Meillassoux
describes as the “correlationist cogito”. The
reality of the thing-in-itself is, in other words,
constrained by the number of finite possibilities
imposed by our human capacity to think. This
means, bluntly put, that even though “for me we
cannot think a tree existing outside thought, …
such a tree might exist nonetheless in spite of my
not being able to think it” (Harman, 2011c: 27,
original emphasis). Harman elaborates on this
point and shows that reality is in fact “hidden” or
“concealed”; however, this does not mean that
things do not exist but rather that our access to
them is limited. Harman goes on to show that we
do not need human Dasein to realise that reality is
always concealed, and that it is not solely humans
that are able to “be-in-the-world”.
“The world is not just Heidegger's "world," but
always a world populated with distinct forests,
atoms, and omens. For this reason, it is misleading
to claim that only the world as a whole has
primary reality, that its constituents are only 
potentially there. On the contrary, the parts of the
world are really there, defending their private
integrity even while besieged by the worldhood
of the world.” (Harman, 2002: 292, original
emphasis).
A vase might be falling in an unoccupied country
house without anybody seeing it being destroyed
into smaller shards of glass. Harman drives this
point somewhat later home when he argues that
“even in the case of direct physical presence an
entity outstrips the thought-world correlate in a
manner that is never merely lacunary [in
perceptual terms].” (Harman, 2011c: 43, original
emphasis). Harman connects the idea of
independent objects to the still largely
unexplored depths of Heidegger’s philosophy of
“absence” to that of the intentional world of
“presence” described in Husserlian
phenomenology.
Tool-Being
Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of
Objects is the product of Graham Harman’s PhD
dissertation (1999) which bears a similar title. The
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book contains a similar critique of contemporary
philosophy as that of Meillassoux’s (2011) After
Finitude, but starts from a different philosophical
premise and arrives at largely different
conclusions. Harman’s main philosophical
influences in his search for an “object-oriented
metaphysics” are the phenomenological protégés
of Franz Brentano. He relies mainly on the works
of Husserl, Twardowski, Whitehead and others,
but also on Bruno Latour and, of course, the
towering figure of Martin Heidegger. The last
thinker provides him with the duality of the
“present-at-hand” (vorhanden) and “ready-at-
hand” (zuhanden) which he, on more than one
occasion, identifies as the idea which made
Heidegger “the single pivotal philosopher of the
twentieth century” (Harman, 2002: 3, Harman,
1999: i). This widely cited philosophical concept
has, despite embodying the central thread of
Heidegger’s entire intellectual corpus, “been
almost universally misunderstood” (Harman, 2002:
4). The reason for this will be discussed shortly.
The other great influence on Harman’s work is
Edmund Husserl whose notions of “accidents”
and “intentional objects” he employs alongside
Heidegger’s tool-analysis[13]. The fusion of these
two sets of concepts and thinkers helps him to
combine Heidegger’s philosophy of “absence”
with a philosophy of “presence” (Harman, 2011b:
35). The result is the materialisation of a unique
“quadruple structure” (Figure 1). He places this
structure, technically inspired by Heidegger’s 
Geviert (fourfold)[14], at the centre of each and
every (animate and inanimate) object.
 
Figure 1: The theoretical sources of inspiration for
Harman’s fourfold structure[15].
Harman’s quadruple structure begins with
Heidegger’s (e.g. 1996) tool-analysis, which is
grounded in the idea of a reality composed of
objects that are hidden from view. Harman
describes the subterranean realm of objects as
“tool-being”. An object is for him a unified entity
which exists autonomously “from its wider context
and also from its own pieces” (Harman, 2011b:
116). A “real object” (defined by its “tool-being”)
is always concealed from other real objects and
therefore absolutely non-relational. Harman
complements Heidegger’s concept of the
concealed nature of objects with the Husserlian
notion of the “intentional” or, as Harman
describes it, the “sensual”. Sensual objects are
the intentional interpretations of concealed
objects by intending objects. They enjoy a rich
relational capacity which helps to constitute the
reality of real, intending objects.
Harman’s resultant OOO must therefore be
understood as a fourfold structure consisting of
two dualisms at the centre of every object. The
first dualism is of a Heideggerian origin and is
grounded in the idea of concealed objects with
equally withdrawn real qualities. The second
dualism is inspired by the philosophy of Husserl
and consists of sensual objects and equally
sensual qualities that are abundantly visible in
their sensuous “present-at-handness”. Reality can,
according to Harman, be experienced as a result
of the tension between real objects and their
sensual translations. This tension is what for
Harman constitutes space. He identifies however,
three other, additional structural tensions: “time”,
“essence” and “eidos” (Figure 2). We will for the
purpose of this paper however primarily dwell on
Harman’s spatial tension which shares the same
strong Heideggerian overtones that we identified
earlier in Sloterdijk’s theory of spheres. First
however we feel that we must explain why OOO
rests on the foundational principle that real
objects are inaccessible. This will allow us to
further elaborate how this inaccessibility of the
real (“the real always hides”) renders into the
need to translate objects into a sensual form.
Most analyses on Heidegger’s tool-analysis, as
Harman (2002) demonstrates, proceed from a
pragmatic philosophy in which “present-at-hand”
and “ready-at-hand” are thought of as parts of a
“practical philosophy” which concentrates on the
tools themselves. Humanity is through its ability to
emotionally and theoretically experience reality in
such accounts raised above the experiential
capacity of both animals and inanimate objects.
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Humanity is, in other words, singled out as the
unique agency which is able to penetrate the
ready-at-hand of tools and to reach into the
subterranean realm of their present-at-hand.
This ability to expose the zuhandenheit of an
object and to return it to a projected “world-in-
itself” is commonly said to be one of defining
characteristics of the uniqueness of humanDasein.
This is, according to Harman, however not how
we should read Heidegger or as Harman notes
himself: “the tool-analysis does not serve to
criticize the notion of independent objects, as if to
champion instead a subjective human realm of
gadgets.… The concept of Dasein is not
introduced in order to rough up the notion of a
world-in-itself” (Harman, 2002: 19, original
emphasis). Dasein does, in other words, not lend
humans a special capacity to access the world as it
really is. This reading of Heidegger’s Dasein
expresses a similar kind of criticism as the one
voiced by Sloterdijk. The latter similarly intends to
break with the “hysteric-heroic subject that always
believes itself to be the first to die and that
remains miserably ignorant concerning its
embeddedness within relations of intimacy and
solidarity” (Sloterdijk 2012: 40). Sloterdijk wishes
to depart from the existentialism from which both
the old and the young Heidegger suffered. Both
thinkers express an eagerness to move beyond
the reified character of Dasein and a desire to
travel to a post-subject/ object philosophy. For
Sloterdijk this means not asking the “who”
question, but the “where” question. Harman
(2002: 128) wishes to leave Dasein altogether and
notes that “the theme of Dasein is subordinate to
the analysis of tool-being rather than the
reverse… [I]t means that the being of an entity
makes only sense in terms of the general strife
between its concealed execution and its luminous
surface.”
Here we seem to have arrived at the thrust of how
Harman intends to break with Heidegger’s
existential Dasein to pursue the phenomenology
of Husserl. The true nature of objects is always
receded from experience which means that any
form of interaction with tool-being can only occur
through an intentional mediation (or “vicarious
causation”) in which only certain so-called
“sensual qualities” of the object are encountered.
Harman’s notion of the sensual are closely related
to Husserl’s phenomenological “intentional
objects”, but are removed from Husserl’s
concealed idealism. They could in fact be said to
perform the role of Heidegger’s “as-structure” in
which the Being of an object can only in a
mediated form be experienced as a “sensual
object”. The “vicarious causation” between a real
object and a sensual one is, according to Harman,
what constitutes space. Space is for Harman, as it
is similarly for Sloterdijk, thus phenomenally
understood as the relation which occurs at the
exteriority of interacting objects. Space is the
sensual as-structure that results from the
relationship between objects. This mode of
interaction is in Harman’s account not reserved to
human Dasein alone which, through its existential
“de-distancing” and “directionality”, is
supposedly able to make sense of the world.
Space is for Harman instead the (present-at-hand)
“broken hammer”. Heidegger is for Harman
(2002: 55) therefore the “[philosopher] of tools
and space”. Let us, however, not get ahead of
ourselves and so briefly return to the debate on
the inaccessibility of the autonomous real object.
The idea of a flattened ontology without
existential anthropocentrism (an “ontological
difference without metaphysics” as Sloterdijk (in
van Tuinen 2011: 49) writes) challenges the
historically long-privileged position of the human
cogito vis-à-vis that of other animals and even
inanimate objects.
Human agency, Harman (1999, 2002) writes, is
through its earlier refuted ability to
makewithdrawn things visible not able to move an
inch closer to the thing in-itself, but rather
provides its own translation of the thing. An apple
remains, even if we would subtract it from its
accidental (sensuous) qualities, for us only an
apple and not a weighty companion as it might be
for the apple tree. What we see is, in other words,
a Husserlian “intentional object” from which we
create our own, intended human world. Harman
calls these specific versions of real objects
“sensual objects” because they exist “only in
relation to the perceiver… [while] the real is
whatever withdraws from that relation.” (Harman,
2011a: 110).
This makes humans in fact not very different than,
let’s say, dogs that similarly “experience” the
object (that we perceive as) “car” through a
specific intentionality from which a sensual version
of the object emerges. It is unlikely that the
sensual object for the dog will be the sensual car-
object that it is for us. What remains for us (and all
other animate and inanimate entities) is, in other
words, a “caricature” of the (subterranean) object
which will always make visible only some of its
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“qualities”. There is for Harman no reason why
humans should be considered to enjoy a
privileged point of access to the real objects that
constitute reality[16]. There is for him therefore
neither a possible justification for a division
between object and subject. Harman does, in
other words, not deny that reality exists (as some
correlationists might argue), but instead proposes
the idea that we can access it only through an
intermediation that creates our intended version
of it.
“If all relations are really on the same footing, and
all relations are equally inept at exhausting the
depths of their terms, then an intermediate form
of contact between things must be possible. This
can only take a sensual form, since it can only
encounter translated or distorted versions of
other objects” (Harman, 2011a: 120, original
emphasis).
The ensuing “democratisation” of access to
reality[17] means that objects will, if made present-
at-hand, instead always be experienced through
their specific, sensuous qualities. All objects are 
for other animate and inanimate objects therefore
Latourian “translations”. This leads to the result
that different “worlds”, alongside the human one,
now start to become possible, but also that the
reality is something that we can openly
“speculate” about but not deny. This means that
Harman in fact proposes an extreme form of
realism from which multiple, overlapping worlds
exist alongside each other.
Objects must then, as we have already hinted at,
have two kinds of qualities: real qualities which
are autonomous and invisible and other qualities
that Harman describes as “sensual” (e.g.
colourful, soft, hard etc.) which do not recede
from appearance but allow objects to be
experienced. The former are for Harman entirely
“non-relational” and remain withdrawn in the
object itself (for which Haman uses the classical
concept of “essence”)[18]. The latter, in contrast,
are responsible for generating a specific tension
with the (always) concealed real object from which
these qualities radiate. Tensions (Figure 2) are in
fact what make objects sensually visible for other
“objects” to experience. They therefore form an
important pillar for understanding Harman’s
object-oriented philosophy as they constitute the
“relations” from which reality gets translated 
for all entities.
 
Figure 2: The Four Tensions in Harman’s
quadruple structure (Essence, Space, Time and
Eidos)[19]
The fact that sensual qualities can make objects
visible comes forth from their ability to relate to
other objects. Harman (2005: 164) describes
sensual qualities therefore as the “glue of the
universe… Instead of God intervening in every
interaction in the world, qualities as a whole now
take on this formerly divine mission, and serve as
the sole conduit between one entity and
another”. It is only through sensual qualities which
reside in tension within the interior or real object
that objects are able to connect and relate to
their outside.
The sensual translation of real objects is, as we
have seen before, the result of an intention which
is responsible for bringing into life the sensual
object (or “sensual vicar”) that mediates between
two real objects. The confrontation between a
real object through a sensual mediation is what
we earlier described as “vicarious causation”. The
causation is “vicarious” because real objects are
inexhaustible and thus need to be experienced
phenomenally (or sensually). The metaphor of
“translation” is neither entirely accidental. A lot of
the original message gets normally lost in its
execution, but the act of translating also holds a
certain transformative power. It creates a world of
meaning. This means that the real object is, as a
result of its encounter with an intending (or
translating) object, first separated from its original
surroundings and “parts” and later reintegrated
to constitute a sensual object. This new sensual
object is, as I will demonstrate more empirically,
also a real object because it fulfils the requirement
of autonomy and unity to define it as such.
Causation between object works however not
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only constructively upwards, but also
constructively downwards. The separating of
sensual “notes” from real objects exposes in fact
an indefinite (or maybe even infinitive) regress.
The “peeling of the onion” helps to expose the
many relations that make up reality, but never
quite manages to confront the concealed
“essence” of all these layers. The peeling of
reality has thus also a transformative function in
which objects are sensually experienced, but
remain forever hidden. This process of ontological
“fissure” of sensual objects is the principle act of
what Harman describes as “allure”[20]. Allure
“splits objects from their notes while preserving
or even inaugurating the connection between
them” (Harman 2005: 254). Alluring is not
confined to human objects, but is also what
(constantly) occurs between other animate and
inanimate objects. Without allure “causation
would be impossible, and the world would be
made up of frozen and isolated monads. But even
this could not happen, since without allure the
levels of the world would never communicate, and
without communication no object could ever be
built up out of parts, meaning that nothing would
have any specific qualities in the first place”
(Harman 2005: 245). Allure is therefore an entirely
relational process. It allows impregnable objects
to communicate with each other in their sensual
form.
Imagine walking across a residential street and
becoming aware of a multi-storey house. One is
consciously or unconsciously forced to accept this
house as an incomplete, concealed translation of
the real entity. This “perceiving” of objects, such
as the house, is however conceptually different
from the act of “allure”. The former translates
objects into qualities or “notes”. Perceiving the
house means therefore taking the door of the
house as an integral quality of the house or
experiencing the house as the integral quality of
the street. Allure refers instead to a downwards
conversion of notes into sensual objects from
which the olive-green door or the Gaudi-like
house becomes ipso facto the object of analysis,
admiration or nostalgia. “Allure is that furnace or
steel mill of the world where notes are converted
into objects.” (Harman 2005: 179). Allure does
not, however, merely mean “separation”, but also
enables a new relation (e.g. between me and the
door). The act of alluring reveals reality therefore
in its sensual form. “[A]llure is a special and
intermittent experience in which the intimate
bond between a thing's unity and its plurality of
notes somehow partially disintegrates.” (Harman
2005: 143). Allure harbours therefore strong
spatial connotations. Space is thus not a container
nor an autonomous entity, but rather the active
tension that lies between the interior of relating
objects.
The gradual deconstruction of the house, as the
act of allure, allows for a process of de-distancing
between the intending real me and the sensual
house which at this point now starts to withdraw
from the intended reality. I am now engaging
myself with the new intentional objects that are
no longer sensual notes but objects (e.g. the olive-
green door, the dirty grey curtain etc.) for and in
themselves. The tension between the real object
and its associated sensual qualities is constitutive
of space. Space is therefore, according to
Harman, the exteriority of objects that relate
sensually. It provides a concrete form to non-
relational real objects and is relationally
constitutive of the emergence of new sensual
objects. It is therefore, on the one hand, entirely
“relational” and, on the other hand, entirely “anti-
relational”. I might stand on the other end of the
road and see my friend’s house. Space becomes
in this instance relational. Upon crossing the road
and facing the house, I am unable to come to
terms with the real, withdrawn house. Space is in
that instance non-relational. “This interplay of
relation and non-relation is precisely what we
mean when we speak of space…” (Harman 2011a:
100).
Through the act of allure we separate the
intended house from its relationship of its
neighbouring buildings, the street, passing cars
and other sensual objects that we think, as we
walk by, are not “part” of the sensual house.
Harman describes this process in which
connections between sensual objects are partly
dammed to prevent the total fusing of reality as
“buffered causation”.
A “buffer zone” is formed from which I am
prevented to access the real object, but can start
intending its sensual spatial form. Such buffers are
constituted by what Harman calls “black noise”
which helps to effectively distribute and channel
the sensual qualities, notes and underlying
relations into a specific sensual object. The
structuring capacity of black noise allows objects
to become sensually visible for me. The resultant
house is however, not merely a schism of human
consciousness, as many traditional
phenomenologists have argued, but instead a real
object which will continue to be real even after
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and before (or completely without) human
presence.
Reality is, in other words, made accessible
through the black noise on the interior of objects
in which accidental notes are buffered. Black
noise does however not construct reality (because
space does), but rather allows it to be
experienced in its sensual form. It is the tension
between sensual qualities within the sensual
object. If space is the constructive and
performative relationship between objects, time is
that which only resides in the interior of sensual
objects. It grants objects to take a concrete
sensual form in one instance. Think for example
about a frozen pizza. The frozen pizza is the
sensual object which hosts time. Time allows for
the tension between the sensual object (the pizza)
and its accidental features (the pizza’s frozenness).
The way we experience time is not progressively
or linear, but through the accidental qualities of
the sensual object. “[T]here is a separate time on
the interior of every object that exists, in which
the internal notes of those objects are showered
with a varying succession of different floodlights,
strobes, confetti, and glitter, while nonetheless
remaining the same. Time is the strife between an
object and its accidents or contiguous relations.”
(Harman 2005: 250).
Time can, however, never affect the real object. It
is for that reason also non-relational. It is
composed of the fluctuating sensual qualities that
make up the appearance of the sensual object.
Time is according to Harman therefore “[t]he
black noise: not the condition of possibility of this
noise, nor the ecstatic structure through which
humans encounter it, but simply this noise itself”
(Harman 2005: 250). Time belongs therefore to
the subjective experience of the sensual, while
space is what is constitutive of changes in reality.
This leads Harman to conclude that “[t]he mere
flow of time changes nothing, and what we are
measuring when we measure progression are
changes in the actual regime of objects, also
known as changes in space” (Harman 2005: 252).
Space is therefore the Heideggerian experience
of the concealed real object.
Harman’s (2002: 253) conclusion that “space is
made up of quanta, because space is the absolute
mutual exteriority of objects” resembles
Sloterdijk’s dyadic structure of spheres. The
technical functioning of Harman’s “allure” and
Sloterdijk’s dynamic process of “coupling” share a
number of interesting commonalities. The former
and the latter are in basic agreement that a space
or sphere is inseparable from the exteriority of an
object that is constituted through the vicarious
interaction between the “poles” of objects. Being
means for Sloterdijk, as we have seen, first of all
Being-a-pair. Coupling (the relational act of
“Being-a-pair”) is therefore always primary to the
individual. Allure is the causal effect of two
interacting objects from which a third object
emerges. Reality is therefore entirely “relational”
and “non-relational”. Both authors also distance
themselves from subject oriented metaphysics
and embrace an ontological theory of space that
is composed of objects. “[A]ll relations must be
viewed as objects, since if a relation is real then it
has a reality inexhaustible by any interpretation of
it or any collision with it, no matter how fleeting
these events may be.” (Harman 2005: 165). All
these real entities form connections with other
object through a vicarious mode of causation in
which “worlds” are constituted. All reality
therefore occurs in the interior of objects. All
objects are within other objects which means that
objects are first and foremost vicarious relations
and that relations are in turn objects. “After all,
the space in which objects meet must already be a
unified space if things are able to meet within it.”
(Harman 2005: 193). It is now perhaps time to
elaborate more firmly on such conceptual
commonalities, without neglecting some of the
ontological differences between Harman’s OOO
and Sloterdijk’s Spherology.
SEARCHING FOR A COMMON SPHERE
Bridging the two thinkers and their respective
conceptual understandings of space will help us in
reopening the discussion of the relationship
between objects and space. Speculating about
the ontological space we encounter in everyday
life helps to challenge the concrete abstraction of
space that has come to dominate all aspects of
social life. It helps to overcome the shortcomings
of the Leibnizian relational model of space, in
which space is reduced to an order of positional
relations. By speculatively decentring space from
mental facticity we can disclose (and potentially
repoliticise) the problem of space. Both Harman
and Sloterdijk have, through different roadmaps,
attempted to read Heidegger’s Being and Time in
a spatial context. For Sloterdijk (in Schinkel and
Noordegraaf-Eelens, 2011b: 12) this translates
into the observation that Dasein shares strong
spatial connotations and “that in Heidegger’s
work lie the seeds of a ‘revolutionary treatment’
of Being and space.” Harman (2011a: 100) moves
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altogether away from human Dasein and replaces
it with a more comprehensive analysis of “tool-
being” which for him “is actually about space, not
about time as he [ie. Heidegger] wrongly
contends”. The idea that Heidegger is a spatial
thinker, shared by both authors, comes at least
partially forth from Heidegger’s  emphasis that
Dasein means both “Being-in” and “Being-with”.
For Harman (2005: 253) this translates into the
observation that space is “made up of quanta,
because space is the absolute mutual
exteriority of objects”. The exteriority of objects
helps objects to translate each other into sensual
images of these respective objects. “The
simultaneous withdrawal of real objects from one
another and their partial contact through
simulacra is space itself.” (Harman 2010:  162).
Space is thus also “always the space of a specific
interior… [S]pace forms the inside of objects.”
(Harman 2005: 250, 251). Space for Sloterdijk
instead refers to the sphere in which Being-in is
always realised alongside a Being-with. Sloterdijk
and Harman share, in other words, the
Heideggerian premise that space is as much
relational (ie. Being-with), as it closes relations off
(ie. Being-in). It reveals and conceals. The
vicarious relation between withdrawn objects
enables for the sensual “world-forming” capacity
that Heidegger initially uniquely reserved to
human Dasein. Space for Sloterdijk creates
subjectivity. The sphere allows for and is
constitutive of life. Space for Harman creates
instead the sensual translation of the always
withdrawn object. The arrival of object subjectivity
means for Harman however, simultaneously also
the neglect of other possible subjectivities and
relations.
This concept of worlding is for neither author
however singular, as Heidegger alludes to, but
rather infinitely plural. “The ‘world’ is [is in the
case of Sloterdijk] not an object for thinking
subjects but rather a continual snowfall of events
which are held in place by what spaces it is
possible to construct and breathe in, what
interiors it is possible to make possible”. The
relations possible in Sloterdijk are “positive”. I
mean by positive that they create worlds (in the
plural). Those worlds are, however, limited to the
still subject-centred intentionality of humans.
Sloterdijk is, after all, primarily interested in those
spatial relations that inform human life and make
it possible. Harman very similarly opens a box of
infinitive potentialities - a word which he dislikes
for its opposition to “actuality” - from which an
entire new “post-metaphysical” understanding of
the world(s) arises. Access to the world is for
Harman, more than for Sloterdijk, no longer
restricted to human Dasein alone. Access to the
world is “democratised” and consequentially
opened to other objects. I will return to this
difference shortly.
Space is for neither author geometrically fixed.
Space has become instead a relational and an
ontological force. For Sloterdijk, space is the
primordial capacity of objects to be comprised
and connect to other objects. For Sloterdijk, every
sphere seems, in fact, an object that is organised
along dyadic, triadic and/ or multi-polar
structures. Space is, in other words, the result of
the inherent capacity of objects to form relations
with other objects that can only occur in and
concurrently give rise to a new object (ie. sphere).
The Being-with and Being-in creates an
ontological trinity in which neither space nor
object comes first, but all are instantaneously and
existentially interdependent (ie. marriage/
husband/ wife, taste/ candy/ mouth, nest/ tree/
bird etc.). It makes for Sloterdijk in this Latourian
framework little sense to differentiate between
objects and subject, materials and souls etc. This
is similarly, but perhaps less metaphorically,
described in Harman’s OOO in which space can
only be created through the interaction (“allure”)
between objects and their sensual qualities. The
hammer can for me only exist in its sensuous
hammer-like quality from which I create my (own) 
objectified world. The falling hammer will, in turn,
however, encounter me in the form of a soft
physical obstacle (my thumb). The hammer thus
exists and relates in its own specific sensual world.
The result of this relational process of allure,
between the object-me and the object-hammer, is
the creation of a space which lies in the exterior of
both objects. For Sloterdijk this form of
“coupling” between objects creates a sphere in
which the hammer is both with me and in (and
therefore constitutive of) a sphere. Both Harman
and Sloterdijk seem therefore in basic agreement
that spheres (or space) are located at the exterior
of dyadic (or multi-polar) objects. These objects
form in turn the interior sphere (or space) of other
multiple polar objects[21]. The workings of space
are for spherology and object-oriented ontology
therefore similar.
Their ontological premises are however different.
The latter preoccupies itself with the intentionality
of all objects with the purpose of unravelling the
mysteries of “tool-being”, while the former largely
explores spheres as the specific intentionality of a
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human agency. Exploring this divergence is
important if we wish discussions to depart from
the prevalent ontic knowledge of the world and
move towards the direction of a speculative form
of realism that could provide a more ontological
reading of space. In the remainder of this essay I
will attempt to understand what causes this
difference. This is not to lead to a full
reconciliation between the two thinkers. The
objective is not a complete synthesis. Too much
of Harman and Sloterdijk’s labours would get lost
in the forceful forging of such a project. I will
instead argue for a more modest conceptual
synthesis between the thinkers’ respective
readings of the ontological functionality of space.
The ontological rift between Harman’s withdrawn
“tool-being” and Sloterdijk’s “Being-in/ Being-
with” is an admittedly difficult one to bridge. This
comes forth from the autonomous nature of
objects in Harman’s work and Sloterdijk’s wish to
rescue the latent existentialism in Heidegger’s
Dasein. The split stems from an ontological divide
as to what Being refers to. Being for Harman is
forever withdrawn and entirely without relations.
For Sloterdijk Being means to be-in and with
others. Being is for Sloterdijk therefore inherently
relational. Human Being (Dasein) remains
moreover, and relatedly, for Sloterdijk unique in
that it is able, as mentioned earlier, to demarcate
and master the environment for the production of
incubators (greenhouses). Sloterdijk time and
again refers to the capacity of humans to create
worlds. It therefore would seem that Sloterdijk
refers to zuhanden instead of vorhanden when he
refers to the importance of spheres for human
Dasein’s uniqueness. However, Sloterdijk (2000:
26) explicitly refutes the claim that he uses
something “merely ontic” for determining what
he considers to be ontology. He perhaps does this
most vocally in his untranslated Die Domestikation
des Seins: Die Verdeutlichung der Lichtung (“The
Domestication of Being: For a clarification of
clearing”). Here (2000) he elucidates in so-called
"paleo-anthropolgical” terms how he set humans
apart from other animals. The text paves the
foundation for his Spheres trilogy, in that it shows
how human production of spheres plays a
fundamental role for the establishment of what we
identified earlier as “ontological difference”
(ontologische Differenz). It is through these,
earlier discussed, worldly spheres that humanity
cuts itself off from the environment (umwelt) and
thus differentiates itself from other animals which
remain restricted to the demarcated limits of the
“en-vironment” (um-welt). Human Dasein is
ontological for the reason that it creates its own,
enclosed worlds independent of the restrictions
from the en-vironment.
It would seem unwise and unproductive to
painstakingly critique Sloterdijk’s historical onto-
anthropological project via Harman. Harman
could argue that other objects are similar to
humans “world-forming” (weltbildend), and
subsequently suggest that the dichotomy
between nature and society is a false one. It
would be equally imprudent to counter Harman’s
withdrawn tool-being from a spherological
position. Sloterdijk would want to pursue the
argument of the human animal’s unique capacity
to insulate itself from the environment and to
create worlds of its own. A complete synthesis
between the two thinkers would therefore be
difficult to realise. Too much of their individual
labours would get lost in such a translation. What
would be more useful, at least for our purposes, is
to instead concentrate on their understanding of
the ontological necessity of the production of
space to create worlds. It is in the acknowledged
importance of spacing (or “worlding”) in which
the two thinkers find a common ground.
The middle ground is situated in their respective
emphasis on the intentionality of space. The
account of Sloterdijk seems to identify objects in
their intentional form in which they are presented 
for something. The sensual quality that makes
something-in-general become a “hammer”
(for us) cannot exist without a relation that
confronts or makes the withdrawn object present
itself as the specific sensual object that is the
“hammer”. Sloterdijk’s divisibility of objects
seems, in other words, to refer to sensual objects
rather than to the real, withdrawn objects
themselves. He does not raise questions (and is
perhaps neither interested) about the hammer’s
Being or what lies outside the intentionality of
Dasein. This is confirmed by the fact that
Spherology is first and foremost an onto-
anthropological theory that starts from
Heidegger’s early ontology in which the
existential powers of human Dasein are central.
Sloterdijk is, in other words, not interested in
answering the “who question” of the later
Heidegger. He is instead more interested about
the “where” of Being and what Heidegger (1996)
called Dasein’s spatiality of the world
[Einräumung]. Sloterdijk’s Being-in-the-world (or in-
the-sphere) is therefore presented in equally
“intentional” terms as the sensual worlds
described by Harman. But while the former is
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/171
Is
su
e 
4.
1 
/ 2
01
4:
 3
0
M
a
ri
jn
 N
ie
u
w
en
h
u
is
Ta
ki
n
g
 U
p
 T
h
e 
C
h
a
lle
n
g
e 
O
f S
p
a
ce
: N
ew
 C
on
ce
p
tu
a
lis
a
tio
n
s 
O
f S
p
a
ce
 In
 T
h
e 
W
or
k 
O
f P
et
er
 S
lo
te
rd
ijk
 A
n
d
 G
ra
h
a
m
 H
a
rm
a
n
dedicated to analysing the intentionality of
humans, the latter provides a broader and more
technical framework for understanding the sensual
relations between all objects.
The emphasis on “worlding” allows us, in turn, to
reintegrate Harman’s OOO, given that the sensual
world is for both authors that which allows for the
mediation between objects. The materials used to
build a house are intentionally used by the
engineer according to their specific (sensual)
qualities that permit her to build a place of
dwelling (or sphere). This worlding process leads
for Sloterdijk to subjectivity and for Harman to the
concealment of the real object. Sloterdijk is,
again, not interested in what might get lost in
translation in the process of “clearing” (Lichtung).
He is instead interested in how objects are used
to create anthropological spheres. Harman does
not deny the potency of the sensual relations
between objects, which he writes are responsible
for the creation of an infinite number of new
worlds, but shows awareness that these simulacra
tell us little about the real objects underneath
these worlds, whereas Sloterdijk refrains from
engaging with other forms of Being.
Objects are for Harman as for Sloterdijk thus
composed of (but not limited to) relations
between their parts or qualities. It is however
equally true “that any relation must count as a
substance. When two objects enter into a genuine
relation, even if they do not permanently fuse
together, they generate a reality that has all of the
features that we require of an object. Through
their mere relation, they create something that
has not existed before, and which is truly one”
(Harman 2005: 85, original emphasis). This relation
between two objects is, as mentioned before, not
established directly, but has to occur vicariously.
The vicarious relation between the notes of
relating objects serves as the glue that constitutes
the universe.
Let us shortly return to the earlier embryological
example to illustrate this more empirically. The
fertilisation of the ovum by the spermatozoa
results in the creation of the zygote. The relation
between the first and second object is entirely of
a sensual kind. The real objects remain instead
entirely withdrawn from the relation. It is however
through the vicarious relation between them that
a third, autonomous object arises. This third
object “has an identity and a depth that belongs
to neither of its parts [equally objects], and which
is also irreducible to all of its current effects on
other entities, or to the knowledge we may have
of it.” Sloterdijk’s study of how the dyadic
relationship between the foetus and the placenta
shape the uterus is another demonstration in
which we see the emergence of third object (the
uterus). This third object is formed in the space (or
sphere) from the mutual exteriority of the first and
second object. The foetus and the placenta
remain, in their turn, autonomous real objects
despite now being “parts” of and standing in a
vicarious relation to the uterus. Space allows for,
or maybe is, the relation. Space is not the object;
it is the mutual exteriority of objects.
Harman’s observation that objects are, but not
exhaustively, composed of relations means that
objects relate to other objects through the
sensual world. Sloterdijk (2010) has Human Dasein
in mind when he argues that “[a]ll being-in-the-
world possesses the traits of coexistence. The
question of being so hotly debated by
philosophers can be asked here in terms of the
coexistence of people and things in connective
spaces”. This could however equally be said for
other objects (inanimate and inanimate) that
constantly and vicariously relate to other objects.
The real object itself does not relate. The hammer
presents itself rather to me in its sensual form (as
the hammer). The thing, which I sensually call
‘hammer’, remains instead withdrawn and
unknowable. The sensual world is flooded with
relations. These relations are characteristically
intrinsic to the sensual. Sensual objects are
constantly both in and with other objects in space.
They relate constantly. Sloterdijk leaves the
subterranean realm of objects unaddressed. His
rich spherology is primarily, if not exclusively,
interested in the sensual process of human (or
Dasein’s) worlding. It is through the sensual realm
from which his onto- anthropology is made
possible. The question, which I will leave
unaddressed for someone else to pick on, is
whether we can equally (yet differently) speak of
an paleo- anthropology of dogs, elephants or
maybe even rocks. These categories were
according to earlier Heideggerians described as
ontic beings that either were “worldless” (weltlos)
or “poor in the world” (weltarm). It seems
increasingly difficult to think that we can continue
to undervalue these objects along purely ontic-
ontological lines.
The Heideggerian message that the world itself is
too big to access in its entirety forms the
phenomenological foundation for the writings of
both authors. They start their respective analyses
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from the common need of objects to “translate”
or subjectively appropriate the world. From this
process numerous worlds alongside the real,
withdrawn world come into existence. Sloterdijk
limits himself mainly to the worlds (or spheres) in
which human Dasein dwells and is made possible.
Harman subtracts the idealism embedded in
Heidegger’s “Being-in” further still and replaces it
with a “democratised” “Being-in” that grants the
emergence of worlds sensually experienced by
both humans and non-human entities.
CONCLUSION
This article was written with the objective of
challenging the silence in the social sciences on
the fundamental question of the nature of space.
The silence of the misplaced concreteness of
space has led the acceptance of space as static
“positions in a nexus of relations.” (Leibniz in
Casey 1997b: 183). The exercise of speculating
about what could constitute space rather than
descriptively talking about spaces as sites and
things that happen in space was undertaken
through a comparative assessment of the work of
two influential contemporary thinkers. Their
analysis starts from a Heideggerian position which
refuses to accept traditional metaphysics and
consequentially transcends Heidegger’s own
thinking. The produce of their labours demands a
radical revision of traditional metaphysics and
allows for a return to a very concrete, albeit
somewhat “strange”, form of realism. An
endorsement of a “flattened ontology” does,
however, not necessarily mean that we now have
to consider stones on the same phenomenological
footing as humans. I would rather propose a
Latourian-Sloterdijkian post-metaphysical
approach on the basis of “ontological difference”.
This difference is for both authors embedded in
the relational capacity of space. It is not the
relation itself. The sensual notes of objects are
responsible for the relation between withdrawn
objects. Space is the result of that relation. The
relational capacity of space, which in the writings
of both thinkers comes to the fore as the stuff that
shapes worlds, makes them what I would like to
call “natal thinkers”.
The first section discussed the work of Sloterdijk
and paid special attention to his spherology. The
theory of spheres has in this article been
described as an ontological analysis of the
necessary spatial (or spherological) conditions for
Being to be possible. Spheres is first and foremost
a work about the human necessity to construct an
interior space (or sphere). Spheres are for
Sloterdijk the product of two exterior spaces that
form one interiorised space. Sloterdijk describes
an onto-topology which departs from traditional
metaphysics and does, therefore, not ask the
question what Being means is but where Being is.
Space is for Sloterdijk, in other words, not
something that is merely created by humans, but
that which always lies at the exterior. Being-in-a-
sphere is therefore perhaps also not only an
exclusively human-specific quality, because his
post-humanism is dedicated to blur the rigid
demarcations between the subject and the object,
the soul and body and the animate and inanimate.
There is some room for manoeuvre in Sloterdijk’s
unique palaeoanthropology. The possibility of
thinking about a non-human world and the use of
a “pre-epistemic” framework bring Sloterdijk into
the maelstrom of Harman’s thoughts. Harman
proposes a more radical, flattened ontology in
which humans are objects just like the books,
coffee mugs and pens on my table. Humans are in
Harman’s account, as in Sloterdijk’s, irreducible
objects through which new vicarious relationships
(and thus new objects) can emerge. Objects exist,
in other words, in tension with their sensual
qualities that help constitute the space of new
objects. Space is for Harman therefore similarly to
be found at the exteriority of connecting objects.
This article has described a form of realism which
provides space the purpose of giving form and life
to an otherwise withdrawn reality. Space
facilitates for Sloterdijk Human Dasein. Dasein is,
as Harman shows, however, not able to come to
terms with reality as such. Dasein instead helps to
spatially interpret and construct an intentional
reality in a manner similar to the tool-being of
other objects. The meaning of Being translates
subsequently into its always sensual 
being-with and being-in another object. The
resultant sphere is not only essential for human
Being but also for all other forms of Being.
NOTES
[1] The author wishes to thank the two anonymous
reviewers for their helpful suggestions on an
earlier draft of this paper. The author is also
grateful to Alex Sutton (University of Warwick) for
his comments on a draft of this paper.
[2] “I hold space to be something merely relative,
as time is: I hold it to be an order of co-
existences, as time is an order of successions”
(Leibniz 2001: 13)
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[3] I will capitalise Being when explicitly discussing
ontology and use a lower case when referring to
ontic existence.
[4] Sloterdijk’s works have in two different periods
been translated into English. The first of which
were published in the 1980s and consisted of
Sloterdijk’s Critique of cynical reason Peter
Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason (Minneapolis
(MN): University of Minnesota Press, 1987). and 
Thinker on stage: Nietzsche's materialism Peter
Sloterdijk, Thinker on Stage: Nietzsche's
Materialism (Minneapolis (MN): University of
Minnesota Press, 1989).. The so-called “second
coming of Sloterdijk” Stuart Elden and Eduardo
Mendieta, "Being-with as Making Worlds : The
’Second Coming’ of Peter Sloterdijk," 
Environment and planning D : society and
space 27, no. 1 (2009). in the late 2000s and early
2010s resulted in the translation of seven other
books which embedded a much stronger spatial
resonance. The recent attention to Sloterdijk
resulted in his invitation to talk at the Tate
Modern in London on Spaces of Transformation:
Spatialised Immunity (in early 2012) and in
dedicated issues in ‘Environment and Planning D:
Society and Space’ Stuart Elden, Eduardo
Mendieta, and Nigel Thrift, eds., Special Issue:
The Worlds of Peter Sloterdijk - Volume 27, Issue
1 (Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space,2009). and ‘Cultural Politics Sjoerd Van
Tuinen, ed.Cultural Politics, Special Issue on the
German Philosopher Peter Sloterdijk - Volume 3,
Issue 3 (Cultural Politics,2007).. Two further edited
volumes S. Elden, ed. Sloterdijk Now (Cambridge:
Polity Press,2012); Willem Schinkel and Liesbeth
Noordegraaf-Eelens, eds., In Medias Res - Peter
Sloterdijk’s Spherological Poetics of
Being (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press,2011). were published with Sloterdijk at the
centre of attention.
[5] Earlier efforts to “spatialise” Heidegger’s work
have also been made by, for example, Malpas Jeff
Malpas,Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place,
World (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2006).
Sloterdijk’s effort, however, is arguably the most
detailed and sustained analysis of the relationship
between Being and space in Heidegger’s writings.
[6] The German publication of Volume II was
published in 1999 but remains as of yet
untranslated in English. The third volume was
published in German in 2004 but has similarly at
the time of writing not yet been published in
English.
[7] The first Spheres book is therefore, as
Sloterdijk notes, “a general theory of the
structures that allow coupling” P. Sloterdijk and
Jean-Christophe Royoux, "Foreword to the
Theory of Spheres," in Cosmograms, ed. Melik
Ohanian and Jean-Christophe Royoux (New York
(NY) and Berlin: Lukas and Sternberg, 2005).: 224.
[8] Sloterdijk metaphorically compares this
medical intervention with the biblical expulsion
from the Garden of Eden as the “primal
spherological catastrophe” [sphärologische
Urkatastrophe]. Sloterdijk keeps on returning to
the creation of dyadic and/ or multi-polar spheres
in different artistic forms and historical contexts
throughout his work on spheres.
[9] This is also the reason why Bruno Latour Bruno
Latour, "A Cautious Prometheus? A Few Steps
toward a Philosophy of Design (with Special
Attention to Peter Sloterdijk) " in Keynote lecture
for the Networks of Design meeting of the Design
History Society Falmouth, 3 September
2008 (Cornwall2008).: 9; also Bruno Latour, "A
Cautious Prometheus? A Few Steps toward a
Philosophy of Design with Special Attention to
Peter Sloterdijk," in Medias Res: Peter Sloterdijk’s
Spherological Poetics of Being, ed. Willem
Schinkel and Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011).
awarded Sloterdijk with the title “THE philosopher
of design… No contemporary philosopher [Latour
argues] is more interested in materiality, in
engineering, in biotechnology, in design proper,
in contemporary arts, and in science more
generally.” For Sloterdijk it is, in other words, the
manufactured materiality of the world to which we
should focus our attention if we wish to
understand dasein.
[10] Sloterdijk P. Sloterdijk, Spheres - Volume I:
Bubbles Microspherology (Los Angelos (CA):
Semiotext[e], 2011). eloquently demonstrates how
in different cultural contexts the placenta used to
be honoured as the twin of the foetus. The onset
of modernity is for Sloterdijk however one of
clinical ‘nihilism’ in which the placenta is thrown
away as residual waste whilst the foetus is
singularised. The initial co-subjectivity was in other
words replaced by the myth of an autonomous
individuality.
[11] For a detailed and critical analysis of the
genealogical evolution of global spheres see
especially Morin’s Marie-Eve Morin, "Cohabitating
in the Globalised World: Peter Sloterdijk's Global
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/171
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Foams and Bruno Latour's Cosmopolitics," 
Environment and Planning D: Society and
Space 27(2009); M-E. Morin, "The Coming-to-the-
World of the Human Animal," in Sloterdijk Now,
ed. S. Elden (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
[12] The other members are Quentin Meillassoux,
Ray Brassier and Iain Hamilton Grant. The term
‘Speculative Realism’ has recently become less
prominent as the philosophies of the original
members have started to diverge.
[13] Husserl employs the idea of “accidents” to
describe the overabundant richness of an object’s
appearance. These accidents do not exhaust
however the object’s reality. An apple does, for
example, not stop being an apple if it would not
have the accidents of being red, sweet and
perfectly round. There exists for Husserl, as for
Harman, therefore a tension between the object’s
accidents (its qualities or adumbrations) and the
unified object (or the particularity of the apple).
This does not mean however that there is a
Heideggerian concealment of the apple at work in
Husserl’s notion of accident but rather that the
apple’s accidents (or adumbrations) help us
“intending” the object as the apple for us.
[14] Heidegger’s Geviert is a notoriously
ambiguous concepts. Harman explains it as
consisting of two dualisms. In the first dualism we
find that objects both are something in general
and something specific. The second dualism
shows that the same object is both concealed and
visible. Harman radicalises this concept and
argues that the object is something in general and
something specific but that its specificity changes
upon the relations that it forms with other objects.
This difference between Heidegger and Harman
also means that Harman reject the idea that
access to objects is solely restricted to a human
agency.
[15] Reproduced with courtesy from Graham
Harman.
[16] Harman does write that humans possess a
more sophisticated range of abilities than other
objects to relate to other objects. He however
argues that all such relations between objects
should be conceptualised on “equal footing” if we
wish to come to an honest and truthful form of
metaphysics. Harman invokes Whitehead’s notion
of ‘prehension’ (here referring to the act of
relating) to substantiate the claim that “[a]ll
relations are on exactly the same footing. This
does not entail a projection of human properties
onto the human world, but rather the reverse:
what it says is that the crude prehensions made by
minerals and dirt are no less relations than are the
sophisticated mental activity of humans. Instead
of placing souls into sand and stones, we find
something sandy or stony in the human soul”
Graham Harman, The Quadruple
Object (Winchester
Washington, DC: Zero Books, 2011).: 46.
[17] This is also the theme of Levi R. Bryant’s The
Democracy of Objects Levi R. Bryant, The
Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor (MI): Open
Humanities Press, 2011) and his proposal for a
‘flat ontology’ which contains some interesting
similarities (and an equal amount of important
differences) with Harman’s own work on OOO.
[18] The real qualities of real objects are those
withdrawn features that make sense of what
otherwise would be a giant nothing or an
indistinguishable and non-differentiable totality.
They exist in tension with the object which
ultimately results into what Harman calls the
essence of the object. “These [real] qualities are
not the same as the real object itself, and hence it
lives in a kind of permanent strife with them,
which is precisely what we mean by essence”
(Harman, 2010: 15). The stone-like or roof-like real
qualities which unify the essence of the
‘houseness’ and ‘treeness’ are not what
constitutes the house but are, reversely, the
qualities that are embedded in the essence of
house. The real qualities of real objects allow, in
other words, for the Leibnizian monadic essence
to be ‘something specific’.
[19] Reproduced with courtesy from the author.
[20] “This term pinpoints the bewitching
emotional effect that often accompanies this
event for humans, and also suggests the related
term ‘allusion,’ since allure merely alludes to the
object without making its inner life directly
present” Graham Harman, "On Vicarious
Causation," in Collapse Vol. Ii: Speculative
Realism, ed. Robin Mackay (Oxford: Urbanomic,
2007).: 215.
[21] There seems to be sometimes explicit and at
other times implicit evidence that the works of
both authors start from the ad infinitum of the
irreducibility of objects. This hypothesis in turn is
validated by modern theoretical physics which
continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/171
Is
su
e 
4.
1 
/ 2
01
4:
 3
4
M
a
ri
jn
 N
ie
u
w
en
h
u
is
Ta
ki
n
g
 U
p
 T
h
e 
C
h
a
lle
n
g
e 
O
f S
p
a
ce
: N
ew
 C
on
ce
p
tu
a
lis
a
tio
n
s 
O
f S
p
a
ce
 In
 T
h
e 
W
or
k 
O
f P
et
er
 S
lo
te
rd
ijk
 A
n
d
 G
ra
h
a
m
 H
a
rm
a
n
similarly argues for the infinitive divisibility of
space. Both authors also seem to agree that
although regress is possible infinitively, it is less
certain that the same works in the opposite
direction.
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